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1  Introduction
A sad mood can affect our way of thinking by slowing down our reason-
ing process, making us pay more attention to detail (Wong 2016; Clore 
et al. 1994; Mineka and Nugent 1995; Clark and Teasdale 1982; Forgas 
1992; Burke and Mathews 1992; Forgas 1995; Salovey and Birnbaum 
1989; Forgas and Bower 1987; Isen et al. 1987). Elation appears to 
have the opposite effect, allowing an abundance of information to flow 
through our senses, painting a multi coloured picture of our social 
environment with a broad brush. Moods, therefore, are affects which 
themselves affect how we reason (Clore et al. 1994; Bless et al. 1992; 
Bodenhausen et al. 1994; Murray et al. 1990; Forgas and Fiedler 1996; 
Wegener et al. 1995; Isen and Daubman 1984; Wong 2016). However, 
that is not the issue I will explore in this essay.
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Moods also set the stage for a variety of human activities, enabling 
and facilitating, or obstructing and undermining our self-centred or 
other-regarding projects. Moods have, thus, a direct effect on the real-
isation of our intentions, setting limits on the potency of practical rea-
son (Griffiths 1989). However, that is neither the issue I will address 
here.
What I am interested in is the rather more basic question as to 
whether moods themselves can be rational. In particular, I would like 
to consider why the question about the rationality of moods is one that 
is rarely, if ever, posed. Books and articles on the rationality, or the fit-
tingness, or the appropriateness of emotions are currently an important 
part of the philosophical literature (De Sousa 1987; Frank 1988; Ben-
Ze’ev 2000; Greenspan 1988; Goldie 2000). Why is there no such cor-
responding interest in the rationality of moods?
Answering that question is a complex matter, whose unfolding might 
have to take into account not only purely theoretical, but also practical 
or historical considerations, pertaining to the formation of the philos-
ophy of emotion as a distinct discipline in the past couple of decades, 
its inheriting certain topics from other disciplines, primarily from moral 
psychology and from philosophy of mind, as well as the understandable 
tendency of junior academics to get things quickly published on issues 
which are already well-established—and the rationality of moods is not 
one of them.
Nevertheless, my own concern is not with the historical but with the 
conceptual issue of what it is about mood, as a specific type of affect, 
that makes it not easily amenable to standard models of rationality. We 
may think of that issue through an analogy with other mental types: 
doxastic states are or should be grounded on epistemic reasons, desid-
erative states are or should be grounded on normative—prudential or 
moral—reasons; are mood states in their turn grounded on some kind 
of epistemic, or practical, or even sui generis moody reasons?
The fact that this kind of question is not often discussed, makes me 
think that the default answer to it, is: ‘No—moods are not grounded on 
reasons’. And my hypothesis as to why that counts as the default answer 
is that most philosophers of emotion, despite their many and deep disa-
greements, share a basic line of reasoning. The rationality of an affective 
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state is somehow depended upon how that state is related to what the 
state is about, its so-called intentional object; but, given that moods do 
not seem to bear an intentional relation to an object, it is hard to see 
how they can be in the offing for rational assessment.
The first part of the paper I shall look at the premises that informs 
the position that moods do not seem to be intentional states. I shall 
explore that issue in the context of the current debate over the rep-
resentational content of affectivity. I will outline three ways of attrib-
uting intentionality to moods, raising for each one of them a series of 
problems. Although none of the problems on its own appears insur-
mountable, they jointly appear to undermine the plausibility of making 
sense of the rationality of mood states by giving prominence to their 
alleged intentional dimension.
Secondly, I look at an account that is encountered in the literature 
on the psychology and physiology of moods; the account sets moods 
as mechanisms whose function is to monitor the balance between the 
demands raised by our natural and social environment, and the physical 
or psychological resources we may expend in meeting those demands. 
Thus, moods might after all be subject to criteria of assessment with 
respect to how well they represent how one fares in the situation in 
which one finds oneself. That is a promising way to proceed in our 
exploration of mood states; it faces though some a formidable challenge 
when it comes to the phenomenology of mood experience, as I try to 
show in the second part of the paper.
Attention to the phenomenology of affectivity is not an optional 
means for enriching the conceptual analysis of mood; according to 
several philosophers of mind, phenomenology provides the right 
methodological tools for making sense of the apparently diffuse and 
all-enveloping character of mood experience. Instead of treating moods 
as a surface colouring of a evaluatively neutral environment, that 
approach sets moods as the inescapable background of our perceptual, 
cognitive, and desiderative engagement with reality. In the third part of 
the paper I address the approach to moods as background feelings and 
raise some doubts about the ability of that approach to provide stand-
ards of assessment of a mood state, standards that would permit apprais-
ing the mood itself as rational.
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2  Moods as Intentional States
A state may count as rational in a theoretical sense if it represents cor-
rectly its intentional object: that is a general statement of the notion of 
cognitive rationality that seems to be currently in play in many discus-
sions of affective phenomena (de Sousa 2011). Disappointment counts 
as rational if it concerns an actual failure, and fear is deemed rational 
if it is directed at a real and imminent threat. It should be noted that 
different notions have been applied in the literature for conveying what 
is distinctive of the cognitive rationality of affective states, including 
reasonableness, fittingness, appropriateness, and proportionality. For 
the purposes of this paper I treat all those notions—which in certain 
contexts are significantly different—as falling under the heading of 
rationality.
Thanks to its generality, that account of theoretical rationality 
for affective states is spacious enough to accommodate alternative 
approaches, which see affective phenomena under the heading of eval-
uative cognition, of appraisal, of judgment, of construal, or of percep-
tion (cf. Morag 2016, for an informative yet heterodox overview of the 
domain).
Despite their substantial differences, those approaches share a com-
mitment to the role of affectivity in referring to something beyond 
oneself, and thus constituting a means (either direct and simple, or 
mediated and complex) of acquiring knowledge about the salient fea-
tures of one’s situation. However, the claim that rationality is some-
how linked to the alleged representational function of affective states, 
marks that model of rationality as distinct from theories which focus 
on the practical, behaviourally adaptive, or strategic function of affective 
phenomena.
If we are to build a viable model for the rationality of moods by 
drawing on their ability to represent correctly their intentional target, 
it is imperative that we supply an adequate theory of the intentionality 
of moods. The modest aim of the present section is to show that such 
a theory is hard to come by; and thus, that an attempt to move from 
intentionality to rationality appears short-circuited from the start.
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The standard way to present the intentionality of a mental state is by 
citing the objects with which it is correlated. In the case of moods, such 
a correlation looks difficult to sustain. I shall focus here on three scenar-
ios encountered in the literature.
The first candidate for an intentional object that is attributed to 
moods is the whole world (Solomon 1976; Lyons 1980; Baier 1990). 
That proposal appears to do justice to the overwhelming character of 
many moods, the fact that moods pervade our experience, that they suf-
fuse all aspects of our encounter with reality. However, taken literary, 
the suggestion that the world is the intentional object of our moods is, 
in my view, problematic for three reasons. First, the proposal employs 
a notion that is not easy to determine. It is not clear whether we are 
invited to think of the world as a maximally inclusive situation encom-
passing all others, or perhaps as an object which has in it everything, 
or as the totality of phenomena linked by a complex network of refer-
ences to each other. It can be retorted that the proposal requires nothing 
more than a loose understanding of the term, as employed in ordi-
nary contexts. However, that retort does not really answer our query; 
it rather shows that the appeal of the proposal trades on the ambiguity 
of the basic term it employs. Additionally, the proposal makes exces-
sive demands on the representational capacities of ordinary subjects. 
An affective state that is intentionally correlated to the whole world 
would entail an ability to form representations that moves well beyond 
the perspectival, partial, and limited access to one’s immediate environ-
ment. Finally, even if we manage to sort out the above issues, the sug-
gestion that moods are intentionally directed at the world founders on 
the problem of distinguishability between kinds of affective states. For 
instance, to be outraged with the whole world is not a mood: it is an 
intense and global emotion.
The second proposal treats the generality of the intentional object in 
a distributive manner. Instead of setting one object (the whole world) as 
the intentional correlate of mood, it takes as object the members of a dis-
junctively defined set composed of anything that comes our way; for any 
object encountered, we have, during a mood experience, a correspond-
ing intentional relation (Solomon 1976; Goldie 2000; de Sousa 2010; 
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Sizer 2000). That proposal has the advantage of offering a way of dis-
tinguishing between emotions (which are directed at a single object), 
and moods (which take an indeterminate plurality of objects). However, 
the proposal appears to me to fail on the issue of intelligibility. A major 
task for an account of intentionality is to help us make sense of the char-
acter of the relevant experience. By correlating the experience with its 
intentional target, the account should contribute to our understanding 
why the person is in the mood that she is. However, treating every dif-
ferent object in one’s environment as the intentional object of mood, 
may render inexplicable why one is in the particular mood that he is. 
A mood is typically a state of long duration: it may last for hours, days, 
or more. During that period, there is large number of objects which 
‘come one’s way’, and which differ in their evaluative shape. In a state 
of gloom, for instance, a person might happen to listen to a jolly tune. 
While it would be incorrect to think that just by listening to the tune 
the person will snap out of her sad mood, it would also be wrong to 
claim that the person is unable to notice the life-affirming air of that 
tune. However, decreeing that the jolly tune is the intentional object of 
the gloomy mood does not render the mood intelligible. Given the wide 
variety in the evaluative profile of the objects in one’s environment, the 
postulated intentional connection between mood and any object that 
happens to come one’s way, fails to discharge the task of rationalizing 
explanation.
The third attempt to articulate an account of the intentionality of 
moods is presented not by reference to some object, either singular or 
plural, but in terms of their representational content. We are invited to 
think that what is represented during a mood occurrence is a property, 
as such: in an anxious mood, it is threatingness, in an irritable mood, 
it is offensiveness, in a mood of contentment, it is delightfulness, etc. 
The property represented by a mood is not attached to anything in par-
ticular: it is unbound (Mendelovici 2013, 2014). The proposal admits 
that moods appear to lack intentional object; but it claims that this lack 
does not deprive them of intentionality, since moods are states with a 
content which represents an unbound affective property. That approach 
initially appears promising, since it sets a criterion for distinguishing 
emotions (which are directed at an intentional object), from moods 
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(which are not thus directed), while acknowledging that each mood has 
a different character precisely because it involves a different mental con-
tent, due to the unbound property that it represents (scariness, offen-
siveness, delightfulness, etc.). However, in my opinion, the proposal is 
problematic on conceptual grounds. More precisely, it is an account of 
intentionality that combines some conceptual confusions regarding the 
idea of an unbound affective property. Here I shall mention only one 
of those confusions, which concerns a fundamental metaphysical issue. 
The intentionalist claims that moods are intentional because they rep-
resent unbound properties. But what exactly is an ‘unbound property’? 
Unless the proponent comes clear on this issue, her proposal is hard to 
understand, and even harder to assess. At a minimum, we require a dis-
ambiguation of the meanings that may be involved in that notion. First 
interpretation: unbound is a property that is not bound to one particu-
lar substance. That is a claim easy to understand, because it is trivial. 
No property is ever bound to one particular substance, each property 
is in principle instantiable at more than one place at once, and that is 
why we often call objects particulars, and properties universals. A sec-
ond interpretation could be: unbound is a property that is not instan-
tiated. If that is the meaning of the notion of ‘unbound property’, then 
it is hard to comprehend how someone can be in a particular affective 
state that represents a non-instantiated property. Notice that the inten-
tionalist does not claim that someone is in a particular affective state 
because that state represents that a certain property is not instantiated: 
that would be the representation of a fact (or of a state of affairs, or of a 
proposition), and our representationalist denies that this is the meaning 
she intends. A third interpretation might venture to focus not on what 
type of property an unbound property is but on how we might think of 
it: ‘unbound’ is a property thought of not as instantiated by an object, 
but thought of merely as a property. Again, that claim offers little help 
in making sense of what is distinctive about the representational con-
tent of mood, or indeed, of any affective state. Considering a property 
merely as a property appears to me to be a task for logical, conceptual, 
or metaphysical analysis; it is simply not clear why the representation 
of the properties—not as being (or soon to be) instantiated, neither 
as owned (or soon to be owned) by some object, nor as exemplified 
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(or soon to be exemplified) by some situation, but—merely as proper-
ties, should have any affective significance at all.
The moral to be drawn from the above discussion is that we still lack 
a satisfactory account of the intentionality of moods; such a lack might, 
for some, indicate that moods enjoy a rather complex intentional rela-
tion to the world, whose structure is not easy to articulate; while for 
some others, it might corroborate their suspicion that no such inten-
tional relation exists. In either case, appealing to intentionality may pro-
vide little joy to anyone who would attempt to ground the rationality 
of moods on their ability to correctly represent their intentional object. 
A theory of rationality that appeals on the state’s alleged intentional 
relation to an object would be hard to sustain in the absence of a via-
ble account of how an intentional relation between moods and objects 
might be possible in the first place.
3  Moods as Second-Order States
Scepticism about the prospects of the intentionalist accounts, have led 
to the articulation of alternative models that approach moods as sec-
ond-order states, which bear no direct correlation to the world, but 
which may activate first-order cognitive, conative, or affective states 
that are intentional in their nature. The literature on the second-order 
approach to moods is voluminous, but here we shall limit ourselves to 
three theories that seems to be directly relevant to the question at hand.
The first theory treats moods as non-intentional states that select, 
out of the vast number of intentional states a person may have, which 
are presently active, and which remain latent (Lormand 1985; for crit-
ical discussion see Griffiths 1989; Wong 2016; Tappolet 2017). Hence, 
among our numerous beliefs and desires, only some of them enter into 
the explanatory, inferential, and justificatory processes which account 
for our, presently occurring, emotionally expressive behaviour, and our 
mental or physical actions. Moods are not to be identified with the 
first-order cognitive or conative states whose intentional contents are 
interconnected so as to give rise to certain pieces of behaviour or the 
performance of particular actions. Rather, moods form a higher-order 
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mechanism of selecting and, in that sense, activating those intentional 
states which form our direct engagement with reality. That theory has 
both some theoretical virtues; regarding, though, the question of the 
rationality of moods, it seems to me rather unhelpful. The problem it 
faces is simple, but rather hard to resolve: let us assume that a mood 
explains and—given certain assumptions about the rationalizing role of 
psychological explanation—renders intelligible, and, in that sense, jus-
tifies the first-order states it activates; however, what accounts for the 
occurrence, the explanation, or the justification of that mood itself? 
What could be the criterion for assessing, in the context of the pres-
ent theory, whether the second-order state itself is rational? Unless we 
are offered a satisfactory answer to that question, the activation theory 
could not help in grounding the rationality of moods.
As we shall see, that basic problem reoccurs in models which, 
although more sophisticated, treat moods as something like ‘the 
unmoved mover’ of our psychological life. Take for instance the quite 
popular dispositional theory, according to which moods are temporarily 
heightened dispositions to make certain kinds of judgement, to form 
certain evaluative beliefs, or to proceed with certain sorts of appraisal 
(for discussion see Wong 2016; Tappolet 2017). Each mood is a 
second-order, relatively short-term disposition (as opposed to a sub-
ject’s overall character, or emotional temperament), which marks that 
subject’s susceptibility to a specific range of emotions. However, even if 
we grant that moods do operate as higher-order factors that determine 
which lower-order emotive states will occur, under certain situations, 
that would do nothing to assuage the worry that moods themselves are 
rationally groundless.
Consider finally, the functionalist approach which is currently gain-
ing momentum in affective science. Moods are treated neither as 
representational states, nor as merely dispositional states, but as a mech-
anism which effects changes at a deep level of our cognitive organiza-
tion. More precisely, that approach sets moods as mechanisms whose 
function is to monitor the balance between demands and resources: 
the demands raised by our natural and social environment, and the 
resources (physical or psychological) we may expend in meeting those 
demands. When the demands exceed the resources, the balance is 
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negative, and we feel ‘low’; when the resources surpass the demands, 
the balance is positive, and the we feel ‘high’. By monitoring one’s cur-
rent level of mental and physical energy in comparison to the demands 
generated by one’s situation, mood serves the important function of set-
ting up the agent to engage in the right task using the right amount of 
energy (Sizer 2000; Wong 2015, 2016).
That is a promising way to proceed in our exploration of mood states; 
it also provides a theoretical context for addressing the question of 
rationality of moods. If what makes something a mood is its discharging 
a certain monitoring role, moods might after all be subject to criteria 
of rational assessment with respect to how well—promptly, comprehen-
sively, or accurately—they represent how one fares in the situation in 
which one finds oneself.
I believe though, that the theory faces a serious challenge at the level 
of the phenomenology of affective experience. Recall that the theory 
offers a criterium of telling the hedonic valence of a mood by means 
of checking how our energy repositories fare vis a vis the exigencies or 
requirements which we ourselves perceive as arising in the situation in 
which we find ourselves. Accordingly, we are invited to think that when 
the energy available exceeds the perceived demands of the situation, we 
are affectively ‘plus’—what is roughly referred to as being in a ‘positive’ 
mood—and when the situation calls upon us to expend energy which 
our current psychological and physical state cannot supply, we are affec-
tively ‘minus’. That line of reasoning appears to me to have the follow-
ing implication.
If the situation, as perceived by us, contains nothing inviting; if there 
is nothing to attract our interest in way that would trigger a desire 
to perform any cognitive or practical task; if, in a nutshell, the world 
around us involves nothing worth pursuing; then our energy level, 
however little it might be in absolute terms, it is evidently more than 
sufficient for meeting the energy requirements of a situation which we 
experience as raising no demands on us. Hence, according to the func-
tionalist theory, that would be a case of being in a truly high mood. 
However, that claim is highly counter-intuitive, if not outright absurd.
Experiencing the world as devoid of any significance—as a field 
where nothing could spontaneously call for our attention, and where 
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values exercise no pull on our affection—is anything but ‘being in a 
positive mood’: on the contrary, it is characteristic of negative mood 
states, ranging from passing boredom, to persistent ennui, all the way to 
deep melancholy, and to major, clinical depression.
Recall that the theory under examination purports to account for the 
valence of moods in terms of their complex representational function; 
it could therefore be thought that the theory offers a ground for ration-
ally assessing moods themselves in light of how well they discharge that 
function. However, looking at the particulars of that process, shows that 
the theory leads to absurd conclusions. At a minimum, it is a theory 
that rings false to the phenomenology of affective experience. Therefore, 
that theory, as it stands, cannot provide the right epistemological con-
text for approaching the question of the rationality of moods.
4  Moods as Background Feelings
Phenomenology might be employed to the benefit of an account that 
does justice to the intimate relation between the way one apprehends 
the world, and the mood in which one is. Accordingly, the question of 
the rationality of moods might be better approached by paying close 
attention to the felt background of our sense of reality. Perhaps, con-
trary to traditional accounts of affectivity, the connection between 
mood and rationality runs deep, yet it is not often noticed precisely 
because it is ubiquitous and indirect. It is ubiquitous, since any engage-
ment with world takes off from some mood state, whose very presence 
renders things around oneself salient as appealing or appalling, welcom-
ing or annoying, familiar or uncanny. It is also indirect, since the mood 
is a pre-intentional state, constituting the background in the context of 
which intentionally directed emotions target their objects.
We may note that there is a variety of felt experiences listed under the 
heading of ‘mood’. The present approach dwells on affective experiences 
which are variants of a non-localized, felt sense of reality and belonging, 
constituting a sense of how one finds oneself in the world as a whole 
(Ratcliffe 2008, 2015, 2017, 2019).
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Accordingly, moods can be thought of as existential feelings, which 
form an inextricable constituent of our experience. We may distinguish 
between levels of existential feelings, differing in degrees of specificity 
and conceptual articulation, ranging from a pure feeling of being alive, 
through to feelings of homeliness or general insecurity, all the way to 
more sharply defined experiences, including anxiety, ennui, or elation 
(Slaby and Stephan 2008; Stephan 2012a, b). Alternatively, we may 
think of the felt rootedness of oneself in the world (what Heideggerians 
would attempt to convey with the notion of Befindlichkeit ) as being 
ever present, yet subject to a variety of more specific configurations 
which mark the distinctive character of different world attunements 
(Stimmungen ) (Hatzimoysis 2010; cf. Fernandez 2014).
The importance of such an account for our understanding of moods 
is hard to overemphasize. I am in sympathy with many of its methodo-
logical strictures, and consider its combination of first-person narrative 
analysis, and analysis of data from the neuropsychology of affectivity, 
as highly illuminating of mood phenomena. It is worth asking there-
fore whether that account can aid us in our search for the rationality of 
moods.
Generally speaking, we may assess the theoretical rationality of a 
state by checking its two ends: where it comes from (epistemically), and 
where it is heading at (cognitively). According to the account under 
consideration, moods are not headed towards anything: they are non- 
intentional states. That claim is not meant to imply that they are dis-
connected from the world; after all each mood constitutes one’s sense 
of one’s being in the world. Neither does it entail that moods are unre-
lated to our perception, cognition, or volition, since moods are taken as 
forming an anticipatory structure of experiencing the world, a structure 
which makes intentional, mental and bodily, acts possible. Hence, the 
term often employed by proponents of that account for characterizing 
moods is not ‘non-intentional’ but ‘pre-intentional’ (Ratcliffe 2019). 
However, that notion should not blind us to the fact that, according to 
that account, moods are not themselves intentionally directed towards 
anything. Hence, it is not possible to build a theory of the rationality 
of moods in terms of how well or badly they fit, or match, or represent, 
their intentional object.
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What about the other end of the mood state: what we may call its 
epistemic source (or its cognitive basis, or its rational ground)? The 
answer to that question I think may be given through a further ques-
tion: what source (or basis, or ground)? The latter question is intended 
as rhetorical, for it appears to me that a core claim of the present 
account is that mood states are not grounded but grounding. That is 
indeed the very reason why moods are characterized as background 
feelings, or as possibility structures, or as styles of anticipation of expe-
rience (Ratcliffe 2019; Slaby 2008; McLaughlin 2009). They do not 
follow upon intentional activity; rather, moods open up or foreclose 
certain ranges of possible experience, enabling or disabling different 
ways of engaging with things, allowing one to be attuned to the world 
and to one’s own self, in some, usually unthematized, manner. If that is 
the case, then looking for an epistemic basis of moods will be in vain. 
A mood cannot be simultaneously what grounds and directs all epis-
temic activity, and what epistemic activity may independently assess, 
since any assessment would be already conditioned by what the cor-
responding mood deems as appropriate, or fitting, or correct—in one 
word, as rational.
5  Conclusion
Our short journey through the sea of contemporary theories of mood 
has steered toward a sceptical destination. We saw that some of the most 
prominent views about mood states fail to offer a secure ground for a 
viable account of the rationality of this type of affective states. Part of 
the explanation for that failure lies, in my opinion, with an implicit 
assumption made by most of those views, to wit that moods may some-
how operate either independently of, or clearly prior to emotions. 
Perhaps, that, currently prevalent, hierarchy needs to be rethought. 
Alternatives that can be put on the table may range from a simple rever-
sal of priorities-treating mood as derivative from a type of long-term 
or low-intensity (Delancey 2006) emotion, to a more radical re- 
categorisation of affective states, by thinking of both mood and emo-
tion as varied exemplifications of feeling consciousness (cf. Hatzimoysis 
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2017), or passions (cf. Charland 2010). Addressing the merits and lim-
itations of each one of those approaches requires a separate, and much 
longer analysis. However, what I hope is made apparent from our 
preceding discussion is that the search for a rationality of moods raises a 
host of philosophical puzzles that deserve our attention.
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